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ESSAY
SYSTEMIC INDIGENT DEFENSE LITIGATION: A
2010 UPDATE
Cara H. Drinan*
Introduction
At the American Bar Association's National Public
Defense Symposium in May, 2010, I delivered a talk on
systemic indigent defense litigation.1 I spoke about this
kind of litigation with measured optimism. Specifically, I
described two pending suits of this kind - one in Michigan
and one in New York - as successful models of modem
litigation in this arena. In May, both suits had just survived
motions to dismiss before their respective state supreme
courts. I discussed the future trials in these suits and the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America.
1 This essay is a by-product of the talk that I delivered at the 2010
American Bar Association ("ABA") National Public Defense
Symposium on May 21, 2010. The full transcript of those proceedings
appears in the same volume of the Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy
as this essay and may be relevant to readers who are confronting
excessive workloads or other aspects of a public defense system in need
of reform. A full discussion of systemic indigent defense litigation-
its history, trajectory and the current model for it-are outside the
scope of this Essay. In previous works I have discussed this kind of
litigation in depth. See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Third
Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 427 (2009) [hereinafter Indigent Defense Litigation]; Cara H.
Drinan, Toward a Federal Forum for Systemic Sixth Amendment
Claims, WASH U. L.R. (Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Systemic Sixth
Amendment Claims], available at http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-
opinions/toward-a-federal-fomm-for-systemic-sixth-amendment-
claims/.
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potential for litigants to replicate the success of these suits
in other jurisdictions.
Shortly after the Symposium, those who were
following the progress of the Michigan and New York suits
were stunned when the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
itself in the same case and granted the defendants' motion
for summary disposition. Not only is the decision
disappointing to the defense community, but also, litigators
in these kinds of suits are left wondering what impact the
decision will have on future systemic indigent defense
claims.
In Part I of this Essay I will describe the systemic
indigent defense suits in Michigan and New York, noting
their similar but ultimately divergent paths. Having done
so, in Part II, I will address the question of how systemic
litigation in the indigent defense arena is faring in the wake
of the Michigan suit. Despite the Michigan setback, this
kind of litigation may still be a powerful reform tool in
certain jurisdictions. Moreover, in some jurisdictions there
will always be the need for litigation simply because it is
the only path to reform. I note three jurisdictions where
litigation is either already happening in some fashion
and/or where systemic litigation may be on the horizon.
Finally, I conclude with the notion that the federal
government needs to play a more active role in indigent
defense reform, whether or not systemic lawsuits enjoy
success in state courts.
Part I: The Michigan and New York Suits
Duncan v. State of Michigan and Hurrell-Harring v.
State of New York were both filed in 2007, 2 and in many
2 Complaint, Duncan v. State (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2007)
[hereinafter Duncan Complaint]; Class Action Complaint, Hurrell-
Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter
Hurrell-Harring Complaint].
2
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ways both suits reflect the model for successful systemic
indigent defense litigation.3 In both cases plaintiffs argued
that the state had abdicated its constitutional responsibility
under Gideon v. Wainwright4 by delegating the provision,
financing, and oversight of public defense services to the
state's counties. 5 Defendants in the New York suit filed a
motion to dismiss in April, 2008, making three central
arguments: that the named plaintiffs could only seek
redress in the appellate process; that the named plaintiffs
lacked standing to raise a claim of systemic deficiencies;
and that the legislature was the proper forum for the
plaintiffs' requested relief.6 Albany Supreme Court Justice
Eugene Devine rejected all three arguments, writing: "The
action primarily seeks a declaration that the State has failed
in its constitutional duty to provide meaningful and
effective assistance of counsel to indigent criminal
3 For example, the suits were filed as a measure of last resort; they
demonstrated system-wide proof of harm to clients; they reflected
strategic decisions on a wide array of procedural issues; they made
reference to accepted professional standards; and they relied upon a
wide network of professional allies. See generally Drinan, Indigent
Defense Litigation, supra note 1 (discussing the model for this type of
litigation and the New York and Michigan examples). The following
suits also reflect, in part or in whole, the model of modem indigent
defense litigation: Class Action Complaint, Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV
95-0545629S, 1998 WL 96407, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 1998);
Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Super. Ct, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass.
2004); Amended Complaint, White v. Martz, No. C DV-2002-133
(Mont. Jud. Dist. Ct. April 1, 2002); Third Amended Class Action
Complaint, Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Bd., No. GD-96-13606
(Pa. Ct. C. P, Nov. 21, 1997); Complaint, Best v. Grant County, No.
04-2-00189-0 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2004).
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5 See generally Duncan Complaint, supra note 2; Hurrell-Harring
Complaint, supra note 2.
6 See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07, 2008 WL 7801294,
at * 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 4, 2008).
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defendants... It would not require the judiciary to manage
discretionary aspects of an essentially executive function of
government. Rather it seeks a determination that the State
has or is likely to violate the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights.",7  One year later, an intermediate appellate court
overruled Justice Devine, finding that the plaintiffs' claim
was not a justiciable legal claim, but instead was "simply a
general complaint as to the quality of legal services offered
to indigent criminal defendants in this state." 8 In March,
2010, the New York Court of Appeals heard oral arguments
regarding the state's motion to dismiss. 9
The Michigan suit followed a similar path.
Defendants in the suit filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the government was immune from suit and that the
case was non-justiciable on several theories. 10 The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that:
[T]he role of the judiciary in our tripartite
system of government entails, in part,
interpreting constitutional language,
applying constitutional requirements to the
given facts in a case, safeguarding
constitutional rights, and halting
unconstitutional conduct. For state and
federal constitutional provisions to have any
meaning, we may and must engage in this
role even where litigation encompasses
7 Joel Stashenko, Suit Proceeds over Providing Criminal Defense to
Poor, 240 N.Y.L.J. 1 (2008) (quoting Justice Devine).
8 Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009).
9 The oral argument may be viewed at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/arguments/2010/Marl 0/Marl 0
OA.htm.1o Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
4
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 3
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol7/iss3/3
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 12
conduct by the executive and legislative
branches.' 1
The Michigan Supreme Court heard oral arguments
regarding the state's motion to dismiss in April, 2010.12
In both the Michigan and New York suits, oral
argument before the high courts in each state focused on
justiciability issues. At bottom, defendants in both suits
made two arguments: 1) that the plaintiffs' claims were
only appropriately addressed in a post-conviction
proceeding and 2) that public defense reform was a
legislative function.' 3 On April 30, 2010, the Michigan
Supreme Court issued a unanimous order ("Duncan 1")
stating that: "[t]his case is at its earliest stages and, based
solely on the plaintiffs' pleadings in this case, it is
premature to make a decision on the substantive issues.
Accordingly, the defendants are not entitled to summary
disposition at this time." 14 One week later, the New York
Court of Appeals followed suit and denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss in Hurrell-Harring v. State.
15
"Id. at98.
12 The oral argument may be viewed at the following site:
http://www.michbar.org/courts/virtualcourt.cfm.
B See Appellants' Brief, Duncan v. State, Nos. 139345, 139346,
139347 (Mich. Feb. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.courts.nichigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/04-
10/139345/139345-7-AppellantBrief.pdf; Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sept. 28,
2009) (on file with author). The oral arguments in the two cases may
be viewed at the following sites:
http://www.michbar.org/courts/virtualcourt.cfm (Duncan),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/arguments/201 0/Marl 0/Marl 0_
OA.htm (Hurrell-Harring).
14 Duncan v. State, Mich. Sup. Ct., Nos. 139345, 139346, 139347
(Mich. Apr. 30, 2010), available at
http://coa.courts.ni.gov/documents/sct/public/orders/20100430_si 3934
5_106_139345_2010-04-30_or.pdf [hereinafter Duncan 1].
'5 Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 66, slip op. at 21 (N.Y. May 6, 2010),
available at
5
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While the April Order from the Michigan Supreme
Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court
declined to issue an opinion. On the other hand, the New
York Court of Appeals opinion created very good law for
future public defense reform suits. Despite the defendants'
claim that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy in the criminal
appellate and habeas process, the Court found that avenue
insufficient to address the systemic claims presented in the
Complaint. As the Court explained, the post-conviction
approach "is expressly premised on the supposition that the
fundamental underlying right to representation under
Gideon has been enabled by the State."' 6 Where plaintiffs
allege, as they did in the New York Complaint, that the
there has been a total breakdown of the defense system, the
Court held that the post-conviction approach is not
appropriate.' 7 Moreover, the Court held that what plaintiffs
alleged in the Complaint was not a "mere lumping together
of 20 generic ineffective assistance of counsel claims" 8 but
rather "a claim for constructive denial of the right to
counsel" on a systemic basis. 19 Finally, the Court rejected
the separation of powers argument with the following: "It
is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action would
necessitate the appropriation of funds and perhaps,
particularly in a time of scarcity, some reordering of
legislative priorities. But this does not amount to an
argument upon which a court might be relieved of its
essential obligation to provide a remedy for violation of a
fundamental constitutional right." 20 In sum, the New York
Court of Appeals opinion provides powerful precedent for
any state court considering the justiciability of these suits
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/decisions/2010/may1 0/66opnl 0
.pdf.
16 Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 66, slip op. at 7.
17 id.
IS Id. (Pigott, J., dissenting at 6).
19 Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 66, slip op. at 14-15.
20 Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
6
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going forward. In particular, it alters the perception that
public defense reform is a purely legislative task, and it
rejects the notion that habeas review is the appropriate, let
alone exclusive, avenue for systemic public defense cases.
In mid-June, public defense reform advocates cited
both the Michigan and New York suits as success stories -
two examples where state supreme courts seemed to
recognize the crucial role that they had to play in indigent
defense reform. Accordingly, court watchers were stunned
in July 2010, when the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
itself in the Duncan suit and issued an order ("Duncan I/')
granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition -
only two and a half months after the same Court had paved
21the way for a trial on the merits.
In stark contrast to the New York Court of Appeals'
opinion in Hurrell-Harring, the Michigan Supreme Court's
opinion in Duncan II, vacating its earlier Order and
granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, creates
additional negative case law with which future plaintiffs in
similar suits must contend. The majority in Duncan II
simply stated that: "The defendants are entitled to summary
disposition because, as the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion recognized, the plaintiffs' claims are not
justiciable. ' 22 Justice Markman, concurring in the opinion,
wrote separately and explained that the Court's earlier
21 Duncan v. State, Mich. Sup. Ct., Nos. 139345, 139346, 139347
(Mich. July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Duncan I]], available at
http://www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/04-
10/139345/139345-7-Order.pdf; see also David Carroll, Mich.
Supreme Court Reverses Course in ACLU Class Action Indigent
Defense Lawsuit, ACSBlog, July 19, 2010 (calling the decision
"stunning"), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/16537; Court
Rules in Favor of Unequal Justice for Poor Defendants, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, July 20, 2010, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20100720/OPNION0 1/7200318/Court-
rules-in-favor-of-unequal-justice-for-poor-defendants.
22 Duncan II at 2.
7
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Order had been in error for two reasons: 1) it had failed to
articulate any governing standards and 2) it had incorrectly
held that summary disposition was premature when, in fact,
summary disposition was appropriate based on the
Complaint itself.23 Justice Markman then cited ten reasons
why the defendants were entitled to summary disposition,
including the following: that the Supreme Court in Gideon
v. Wainwright was concerned with "results, not process;"
24
that plaintiffs' claims are non-justiciable; 25 that there is no
constitutional right to a "meaningful relationship with
counsel';, 26 and that plaintiffs were asking the Michigan
courts to violate the separation of powers doctrine by
seizing traditionally legislative tasks from state
lawmakers. 27 In short, Justice Markman's opinion adopted
wholesale the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion from
June, 2009.28
The Duncan II decision is flawed for several
reasons.29 First, in order for the Court to vacate its original
order and reverse its decision regarding the defendants'
motion to dismiss, the Court needed to find that its
"previous ruling rested on a 'palpable error.' 30 It strains
credulity to imagine what that error was since the Court's
new order comes only two and a half months after its
original order and is based exclusively upon the dissenting
opinion from the appellate court decision -- an opinion that
was before the Court when it originally ruled unanimously
23 id.
24 Id. (citation omitted).
25 Id. at 2-3.
26 Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
27id.
28 id.
29 The Duncan II opinion, its legal underpinnings, and its implications
will undoubtedly be the subject of future scholarship. My goal in
discussing the opinion in this essay is to offer a preliminary response.30Duncan II at 5 (Kelly, C.J. dissenting).
8
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in favor of the plaintiffs. 3' As the dissenting opinion in
Duncan H correctly notes: "we were certainly aware when
we issued our previous order that, by affirming only the
result reached by the Court of Appeals, we were remanding
the case without a controlling standard., 32 Moreover, as
the dissent states: "plaintiffs correctly note that defendants'
motion [for reconsideration] merely repeats the arguments
it made earlier and that defendants are effectively asking
this Court to issue an advisory opinion." 33 As a procedural
matter, the opinion in Duncan II was inappropriate.
Second, to the extent that the Court's decision rests
upon adoption of the appellate court's dissent, the decision
rests on misguided legal foundations. For example, it is
simply not the case that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is "concerned with results, not process." 34 In fact,
the contrary is true -- no defendant has the right to an
outcome of a certain verdict or sentence; but every
defendant has the right to certain procedural safeguards,
including zealous defense representation, throughout the
35
entire adversarial process.
31 id.
32 Id.
33 id.
34 1d. at 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
35 See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (reaffirming
that Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of
adversarial proceedings in order to protect the defendant's rights as the
state moves forward with its case). There are other ways in which the
Duncan II opinion rests on flawed legal analysis. A full discussion of
those issues is outside the scope of this essay, but for example, the
Court's reference to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
and its prejudice prong is completely inapposite in a case like Duncan
where plaintiffs seek prospective relief. See Cara H. Drinan, The
National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the
Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2010),
SSRN draft at 22-23, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1448058.
9
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Third, the decision errs in its assessment that the
court cannot be involved in a suit of this kind without
stepping on the toes of the state's executive and judicial
branches. It is the province of the courts to identify
constitutional violations and to order parties to cure such
violations. 36  If, as a result of a court doing so, a state
legislature ultimately has to expend funds, so be it. That
outcome in no way undermines the Court's authority to
identify a constitutional defect in the first instance.
Finally, the Court's decision in Duncan 1I was
premature, as the Court recognized in its own initial order
allowing the case to move forward.37 In order to survive a
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs needed to state a legal claim
on which relief could be granted.38 This they did, as the
Michigan Supreme Court implicitly recognized when it
originally rejected the defendants motion for summary
disposition in its April Order. At this stage of litigation,
plaintiffs did not need to address the question of
appropriate remedies, the issue of funding for indigent
defense representation, or the extent to which future
potential injunctive relief would interfere with ongoing
criminal proceedings. All of these issues appear to have
been of newfound great concern to the Duncan I Court,
39
and they are entirely outside the realm of a motion for
summary disposition. This reversal is stunning, and it
raises doubts about the ability of elected judges to
36 Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 66, slip op. at 20 (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 147 (1803)).
37 Duncan I, supra note 14 ("This case is at its earliest stages and,
based solely on the plaintiffs' pleadings in this case, it is premature to
make a decision on the substantive issues. Accordingly, the defendants
are not entitled to summary disposition at this time.").
38 MICH. CT. R. § 2.116(C)(8) (West 2010).39 Duncan II at 2-3.
10
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impartially rule on questions that implicate the operation of
a criminal justice system which the bench itself oversees.4 °
Part II: Systemic Indigent Defense Litigation in the
Wake of the Duncan Suit
The picture of public defense litigation may not be
as bright as it was even two months ago when both the New
York and Michigan suits appeared to be moving toward
trial. However, there is still much to be said for systemic
litigation as a tool for defense reform advocates. First, as
the New York suit demonstrates, these cases can make it
out of the gates - something many reformers did not think
was possible even ten years ago.41  The lesson of the
Michigan and New York comparison may be that parties
bringing these types of suits need to be very thoughtful
about the states in which they choose to seek judicial
reform. Second, the Michigan experience may indicate that
systemic litigation can be effective, but that now, more than
ever, litigants need a federal forum in which to bring these
types of suits. 42  Third, defense reformers may need to
40 See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 20-21 (2004) (discussing the problem of
defense functions that do not have independence from judicial
influence and citing examples in Michigan), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/full
report.pdf; See also Amanda Frost and Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REv. 719, 731-40
(2010) (discussing the evidence that suggests elected judges are, in fact,
influenced by majority preferences, especially in comparison to
appointed judges).
4 See, e.g., Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138 (Va. Ct. App.
2000) (rejecting challenge to statutorily-capped court-appointed
attorney fee system and determining reform was legislative concern).
42 I have written on the need for a federal forum for these types of
claims in prior works. See also Drinan, Indigent Defense Litigation,
11
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think about a two-tiered approach to litigation where
systemic suits and individual suits, challenging, for
example, excessive caseloads, are brought simultaneously.
In this way, when and if a systemic suit makes its way to a
state Supreme Court, that court has a body of individual
challenges before it that substantiate the breadth of the
systemic challenge. Finally, it is important to note that, in
some jurisdictions, litigation - regardless of its risks and
costs - may be the only available path to meaningful
indigent defense reform.43 For example, Texas, Georgia,
and Utah are states where the indigent defense crisis is
acute. If the legislative and executive bodies in these states
cannot reform the systems sufficiently, systemic litigation
may be necessary,
Texas is notorious for its public defense
shortcomings. Before its passage of the Texas Fair Defense
Act in 2001 44 the county-run system was referred to as a
"national embarrassment. 4 5  This reputation was due to
several factors: a lack of independence in the appointment
of defense counsel; a lack of state financing for public
defense; and a lack of statewide standards for the
supra note 1, at 467-75. See generally Drinan, Systemic Sixth
Amendment Claims, supra note 1.
43 NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 210-211(2009) (discussing need
for litigation when other options have been exhausted), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf.
44 See Diana Jennings, Legal Defense for Poor Is Looking Better:
Agencies Taking Steps Required by New Law, but the Jury Is Out,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 13, 2002, at 39A (describing
components of the law).
45 Fox Butterfield, Texas Nears Creation of State Public Defender
System, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2001, at A14 (quoting state bar
association report).
12
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appointment and performance of defense counsel.46
Unfortunately, today, almost a decade after the state's
enactment of public defense reform legislation, "Texas is
reaching a crisis point, putting itself at risk of a civil rights
lawsuit.''47 In particular, the state has failed to contribute
meaningfully to public defense financing, and because the
overall costs of public defense in Texas have nearly
doubled since 2001, the counties are struggling to close a
48huge fiscal gap. In 2009, statewide public defense
services cost $186.3 million dollars, but the state
contributed only 15% of that amount.49 The persistent lack
of independence in the appointment of defense counsel in
Texas5 and the chronic under-funding of defense services
by the state, coupled with the state's tough-on-crime
reputation, make it a jurisdiction ripe for litigated reform,
as local experts have already noted.5'
Like Texas, Georgia has a long-standing reputation
for failing its indigent defense clients, and it also has
attempted to improve its defense services through
legislative reform. In 2003, responding to years of
46 Id; see also TEXAS APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, THE FAIR
DEFENSE REPORT: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE PRACTICES IN TEXAS, (2000)
http://texasappleseed.net/pdf/projects fairDefensefairreport.pdf.
47 Brandi Grissom, Defenseless, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, May 19, 2010,
available at
http://www.texastribune.org/stories/2010/may/19/defenseless/.
48 id.
4 9 id.
50 Editorial, Fix the System: A Public Defender Office Would Improve
the Quality of Justice Here While Saving Taxpayer Dollars, HOUSTON
CHRON., March 20, 2008, at B8 ("Although judges are supposed to use
an impartial rotating list of available attorneys, in practice the system is
easy to manipulate in favor of particular lawyers who might be friends
or political contributors. An attorney who displeases a judge can be
removed from the appointment list.").
51 Grissom, supra note 47 (quoting the Texas Fair Defense Project's
Executive Director as saying "The situation in Texas is not that
different from the situation in states that have seen litigation.").
13
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criticism of its county-run system, Georgia enacted
legislation that established a public defender within each
judicial circuit, and in 2004 state funding for the system
was enacted.52 At the time, the state's reform efforts were
cited as a model for other jurisdictions to follow.53
Unfortunately, the state has not maintained its
exemplary status. Facing rising public defense costs,
especially related to conflict cases, state legislators have
considered returning thousands of indigent defense cases to
county control - the very type of control that the 2003
legislation was designed to change. 54 Jamie Weis's case
illustrates well the extent of the state's public defense
crisis. In February, 2006, Mr. Weis was arrested and
charged with a capital crime.55 More than three years later,
his case was finally placed on a trial calendar.56 Despite
Mr. Weis's claim that a lack of state funding for his defense
counsel hampered his case and deprived him of his right to
a speedy trial,57 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the
state may move forward with its case against Mr. Weis.
58
Moreover, as a result of the Court's ruling, Mr. Weis will
need to work with replacement counsel, despite the fact that
those public defenders are already overworked and lack the
52 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 40, at 30.
53 id.
54 See also Bill Rankin, Indigent Defense Legislation Delayed Until
Next Year, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, Apr. 22, 2010,
available at
http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/indigent-defense-
legislation-delayed-484553.html. See generally Bill Rankin, Proposal
Would Split Public Defender System, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL
CONSTITUTION, Feb. 24, 2010, available at
http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/proposal-would-
split-public-326988.html.
55 Weis v. State, 2010 WL 1077418 at *1 (Ga. Mar. 25, 2010).56 Id. at *3.
51 Id. at *3-7.
58 Id. at *7; see also John Schwartz, Murder Case May Proceed in
Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A13.
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investigative and expert resources necessary to defend
him.59 The Southern Center for Human Rights has filed a
petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court
on Mr. Weis's behalf, arguing that Mr. Weis has a right to
continuity of counsel and that Georgia's failure to provide
funding for Mr. Weis's lawyers for over two years
constitutes a "systemic breakdown in the public defender
system" which "should be charged to the State for speedy
trial purposes."
60
Even though Georgia has had experience with
systemic public defense reform litigation in the past,61 its
current state of affairs begs the question whether the
jurisdiction may be ripe for litigated reform again. Indeed,
if the state's public defense funding crisis can bring most of
its capital cases to a "standstill, 62 leaving defendants like
Mr. Weis with no representation for years, the reform
efforts of 2003 have not cured the state's fundamental
defense problems, and a new round of systemic litigation
may be on the horizon.
Utah remains only one of two states nationally that
provides no state funding toward public defense services,
63
and it ranks forty-eighth in the nation for per capita
spending on indigent defense. 64 Further, the state provides
no oversight, training or quality standards for the various
counties that provide representation to indigent
59 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Weis v. State, (No. 09-10715), 7-
8, 23-24, (May 10, 2010),
http://www.abajournal.com/files/WeisCertPetition.pdf.60 Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
61 See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 40, at 30 (citing lawsuits
by the Southern Center for Human Rights and the NAACP designed to
improve the state system prior to the 2003 legislative overhaul).
62 Brenda Goodman, Georgia Murder Case's Cost Saps Public Defense
System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at A16.6TJUSTICE DENIED, supra note 43, at 54.
64 Tim Gurrister, Ethridge Keeps Defenders, Waits for Dentist,
STANDARD-EXAMINER, May 8, 2010, 2010 WLNR 9568022.
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defendants.65  Counties are free to choose their own
systems for the delivery of public defense services, and
historically, most counties have chosen a contract or
assigned counsel system.66 Recently, one of the two Utah
counties that had been operating a public defender office
closed that office and moved to a flat-fee contract system as
a cost-saving measure.
67
The American Civil Liberties Union (the "ACLU")
recently intervened in a Utah capital case where the state
has tried to remove the defendants' two lawyers, both of
whom were previously employed by the now-defunct
public defender office. 68 The ACLU and the public defense
attorneys in the case argue that their client is
constitutionally entitled to continuity in his representation,
similar to the claim asserted in the Weis case in Georgia.
69
Further, the ACLU brief raises systemic concerns, in
particular the fact that the state fails to fully comply with
any of the Ten Principles that the ABA uses to measure the
efficacy of a public defense delivery system.70 The state's
persistent absence from the public defense function,
excessive caseloads, and a high-profile capital case that
drives home the cost of a broken system, make Utah a
jurisdiction that may see systemic litigation in the near
future.
65 David Carroll, Gideon Alert: Right to Counsel Threatened After Utah
Public Defender Office Closes, Apr. 22, 2010, available at
http://www.nlada.net/www.nlada.net/library/article/ut_righttocounselan
ddp04-22-2010_gideonalert.66 id.
67 id.
68 Tim Gurrister, ACLU Accuses Weber of Cost-Cutting in Double-
Murder Defense, STANDARD-EXAMINER, April 23, 2010, 2010 WLNR
8442940.
69 Request for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae in Opposition to
Motion for Substitution of Counsel, State v. Ethridge, No. 018901539
(Sec. Jud. Dist. Ct. Weber County April 20, 2010),
http://www.acluutah.org/Ethridge 042010_motion amicus.pdf.
70 d. at 3.
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Part III: Conclusion
Even in the wake of the Michigan Supreme Court's
Duncan II decision, there is a role for systemic indigent
defense litigation to play. Litigation can be an impetus for
legislative action; it can generate media attention that
informs the public; and it may, as the New York suit
demonstrates, even make it to trial. Going forward,
litigants need to be thoughtful about selecting jurisdictions
where they seek judicial reform. At the same time, they
need to continue to press for a federal forum for these types
of claims in order to minimize the majoritarian pressure to
be tough on crime that may weigh on elected state judges.
Finally, the federal government needs to be at the forefront
of nationwide indigent defense reform. It can do this in a
number of ways, as scholars have discussed and as the
newly created Access to Justice Initiative within the
Department of Justice has explained.71 For example, the
federal government can file amicus briefs in ongoing state
litigation like the New York suit; it can generate critical
data that enables states to measure systemic defense
shortcomings; and it can use its bully pulpit to inform the
public as to why access to counsel is so vital to all citizens.
Whatever priorities it chooses to set in this realm, it is clear
that going forward, when state judicial and legislative
bodies turn a blind eye to indigent defense crises, the
federal government cannot stand on the sidelines.
71 On June 19, 2010, at the American Constitution Society National
Convention, a panel of experts discussed the "federal role in improving
indigent criminal defense." Many proposals, including some
mentioned here, like the filing of amicus briefs, were discussed by
panelists. The panel may be viewed here:
http://www.acslaw.org/node/16402.
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